Mongolei: Kilometerlange Schlangen an Tankstellen: Wie Russlands Einfluss in Zentralasien zerfällt

As of August in Ulan Bator, the capital of Mongolia, long queues of cars form at fuel stations stretching hundreds of meters along the roads. With vehicle after vehicle, some stretching for kilometers, drivers are only allowed to fill up to 50,000 tugrog (around 13 Euros) worth of gasoline, often waiting for up to three hours. Horns blare, cries ring out, and some drivers try to rush ahead.

Filling stations are forbidden from stocking up in advance. Some give up, planning to return the following day once the queues have thinned. The fuel crisis stems from 4,000 kilometers away in Europe. Ukraine has attacked Russian refineries. Moscow has limited its fuel exports and even imposed export bans on gasoline. Mongolia, once a satellite state of the defunct Soviet Union, initially escaped the crisis.

But the country, which relies on Russia for 95 to 97 percent of its fuel needs, immediately feels any reduction. Official Mongolian figures show that fuel imports from Russia dropped by 17 percent in June and 40 percent in July. The supply crisis demonstrates that Russia can no longer reliably supply its periphery like it did before the Ukrainian war - thus losing a crucial instrument of its influence.

This highlights the supposedly unbreakable relationship between Russia and China. China has committed to supplying more fuel to Mongolia, with the first 1,000-ton cargo of jet fuel passing through Mongolia's Zamyd-Uud border crossing last week. By easing Mongolia's dependence on Russia, Beijing simultaneously weakens Moscow's influence over the former satellite state.

Similar trends can be observed in other Central Asian states, the traditional political backwater of Russia. China and Russia are now competing fiercely for access to resources, infrastructure projects, and political influence in the region. Russia's war-induced weakness, whether through Western sanctions or damaged refining capacities, opens up new opportunities for China.

Third countries are also benefiting. South Korea, for instance, increased its fuel supply to Mongolia under its third-country policy. Seoul also agreed to provide fuel to Ulan Bator. Mongolia is building its own refinery with Indian investors. However, Mongolia's geographical isolation, being a landlocked country between Russia and China with no sea access, makes it vulnerable to China's strategy.

The country is landlocked between Russia and China, with no sea access. South Korea, while having a sea border with the hostile North Korea, shares only a closed land border with it. Korean fuel deliveries therefore go by ship through the Chinese port of Tianjin and by train through Chinese hinterland to Mongolia. China has long been using this corridor.

Beijing funds and operates the railway connection from the coal mine district of Tavan Tolgoi to its own border, bundling raw materials and associated infrastructure in one project. China is the main importer of Mongolian resources, mainly coal and copper, and is by far the largest trading partner. "No country can escape its neighbor," former German ambassador Peter Schaller said in a lecture in Ulan Bator, referring mainly to China and Russia.

This has implications for the West: Germany, for its part, attempts to establish a foothold in the country through a bilateral raw material agreement concluded in 2011, but with little success: According to a recent analysis by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung from March, the raw material partnership is insignificant. In five years, only slightly more than 200 tons of refined copper worth 828,000 Euros were imported to Germany.

Ten years after the partnership was concluded in 2021, only 0.2 tons of copper ore had been exported. China is increasingly dominating: Mongolia hopes to increase trade with China, the country's largest importer of its coal and mineral exports, by more than a tenth this year, deepening its economic dependence on the giant neighbor.

China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently pointed to international figures showing that a one percentage point increase in China's economic growth triggers a four percentage point rise in Mongolia's exports and an increase of 0.6 percent in Mongolia's gross domestic product. The paradox is that Mongolian mining companies and their Chinese clients need Russian fuel for their machinery.

The war in Ukraine, with its consequences for Moscow's economy, thus indirectly affects China's supply chains in Mongolia. An indirect effect that Beijing has noticed.