Any attempt for DAP to leave the government would strengthen the politics of attacking it — Phar Kim Beng

On August 13, DAP delegates will convene to determine if the party should continue in government posts for the rest of the parliamentary term. The decision will have significant implications beyond DAP itself. Although the party faces serious electoral setbacks, DAP must acknowledge a critical strategic reality: leaving government could inadvertently strengthen opposition efforts to attack it.

Firstly, remaining in government provides DAP with an advantage that opposition parties lack: administrative performance. Cabinet ministers can showcase policies, budgets, infrastructure projects, and measurable outcomes to demonstrate their party's identity extends beyond mere opposition to accusations. Should DAP withdraw, it may be forced to engage in perpetual defense of its purported identity, making it difficult to showcase its administrative accomplishments.

Secondly, DAP's departure could inadvertently fortify the argument for closer cooperation between the Barisan Nasional (BN) and Pakatan Nasional (PN) parties. The recent Negeri Sembilan election and the potential for increased alignment between BN and PN among Malay voters in Johor illustrate this trend. By portraying DAP as a threat, BN and PN could forge a common adversary, rendering DAP's departure a strategic boon for their electoral cooperation.

Thirdly, leaving government could limit DAP's ability to challenge the narrative surrounding "Malay-Muslim unity." The party's association with this term has grown stronger, serving as a convenient political antagonist for Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. Inside government, DAP ministers can represent Malaysia's constitutional monarchy and federal institutions, showcasing the party's accountability to the electorate.

But without this institutional platform, PAS could more readily portray DAP as a destabilizing force, exploiting the very accusation that DAP seeks to suppress.

Lastly, DAP's withdrawal might intensify the opposition's focus on DAP, rather than weakening it. PAS, a key antagonist, does not require a powerful DAP to sustain its anti-DAP narrative; merely its political utility is sufficient. The accusation would persist, with PAS refining its rhetoric to reflect the new target. In summary, DAP's decision to withdraw from government could inadvertently bolster opposition attacks, rather than weaken them.