PM takes notice of future after ordering it cancelled

For decades, the author has been attempting to convince Pakistan's institutions to adopt a long-term perspective instead of being fixated on short-term news cycles. They developed the Pakistan State of Future Index (PK-SOFI) to evaluate the country's progress against its own long-range indicators. Despite efforts, they continue to question why foresight remains absent in Pakistan, despite investing resources into building divisions, running scenarios, and publishing white papers.

The reason lies in the fact that foresight is not a part of public policy in Pakistan. There is no government body mandated to continually monitor and integrate horizon-scanning and scenario planning into policy-making processes. Instead, there are sporadic exercises, personality-driven units, and donor-funded pilots which create reports but fail to influence actual decisions.

The country has undergone 25 IMF bailouts since 1958, with government agencies spending a significant portion of each decade on short-term fiscal survival rather than long-term fiscal design. Compounding this issue is Pakistan's volatile security situation, which has included multiple wars with India, the loss of East Pakistan in 1971, a decades-long counterinsurgency, and recurring floods.

Additionally, governments rarely complete a full term, leaving little room for policymakers to focus on long-term planning. The author argues that foresight requires patience and the ability to sit with uncertainty while mapping possible futures before committing to one. In a system constantly in a state of emergency, this level of patience is perceived as a weakness.

One of the main reasons for the lack of foresight in Pakistan is the bureaucratic incentives that discourage the very mindset required for effective foresight. To perform this work honestly, one must present multiple scenarios rather than a single predetermined plan, which is often seen as a sign of weakness in a system that values certainty.

Devolution to the provinces has formally granted them planning authority, but there is no supportive infrastructure of foresight at the provincial level. No data systems, trained analyst cadre, or dedicated budget lines exist to support provincial-level foresight. This is due to a lack of central investment in building the necessary capabilities.

The author highlights the difference between Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan in their engagement with long-range planning, as well as the marginalization of AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan from national foresight discussions. Institutional memory also resets with each change of government, making it difficult for foresight initiatives to persist beyond a single leadership term.

Throughout the author's experience, strategy divisions have ceased meetings within eighteen months of a leadership change, not due to cancellation, but because no one took the necessary steps to keep them active. Other countries demonstrate alternative approaches to foresight. Singapore's Centre for Strategic Futures operates within the Prime Minister's Office and is government-funded, training civil servants across ministries.

Finland's Committee for the Future has been a permanent standing committee since the early 1990s, with government budgets and legal requirements demanding long-term future projections from every administration. The UK runs a standing Horizon Scanning Programme feeding Cabinet-level planning, while South Korea's National Assembly has its own futures institute.

Even China and the US, despite their ideological differences, have integrated foresight into their governance structures, with China's Five-Year Plans and the US National Intelligence Council delivering global trend reports to incoming administrations. None of these systems rely on individual champions or grant cycles; instead, they are grounded in statute, budget allocation, and a permanent presence within government, which is precisely what Pakistan has failed to establish.