America needs Korean shipyards

The United States relies heavily on sea-based trade to sustain its economy, with more than 90 percent of global commerce conducted via maritime shipping lanes. These vital waterways are crucial for the flow of energy resources, raw materials, semiconductors, and critical minerals that underpin international commerce and global power dynamics.

The interdependence between maritime security and economic dominance is clear: nations that maintain control over the seas ultimately dictate the global economic landscape and shape the international order.

In light of this, the Korea-U.S. alliance is shifting towards a new strategic partnership, transcending the traditional land-based security framework to encompass a broader maritime alliance. While the United States maintains the world's most formidable naval force, its shipbuilding capabilities have stagnated dramatically since the conclusion of the Cold War.

Since the end of the military confrontation, the number of U.S. shipyards and skilled maritime labor force has dwindled steadily, constraining shipbuilding capacities and hampering the expansion of naval fleets. The shortfall in shipbuilding capacity has, in turn, weakened the U.S. Navy's maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) capabilities, rendering them insufficient to adequately support the Indo-Pacific strategy.

This decline in American shipbuilding prowess can be attributed to the cumulative impact of decades-long protectionist maritime policies. Two of the most influential laws, the Jones Act and the Byrnes-Tollefson Amendment, have gradually undermined America's ability to compete globally in the shipbuilding sector. These statutes have inadvertently eroded the nation's industrial prowess and limited its capacity to project naval power in the critical regions of the Indo-Pacific.