Taiwan’s Missing Deterrent
Conventional deterrence alone overlooks the vector of conflict most likely to define a cross-strait crisis: civil defense.
Taiwan's deterrence strategy against China's aggression is heavily reliant on American weapons, security assistance, and military technology collaboration. Conventional deterrents, such as F-16V fighters, Indigenous Defense Fighters, Patriot missile systems, Hsiung Feng anti-ship missiles, sea mines, and Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems, are crucial in preventing adversary air superiority, repelling amphibious invasions, and countering initial attacks.
However, conventional defenses alone do not account for the most likely conflict vector in a cross-strait crisis: civil defense. Chinese economic coercion, Taiwan's vulnerable submarine cable network, and Beijing's cognitive warfare apparatus pose significant threats that cannot be addressed solely militarily. Taiwan must prioritize robust civil defense to withstand unconventional disruptions to daily life and societal preparedness for crises.
Taiwan's civil defense capabilities currently lack coherence due to fragmented initiatives, uneven coordination between civil and military sectors, and political stagnation. Protracted conflicts necessitate resilient civil defense measures to counter technologically superior adversaries. Ukraine's successful resistance against Russia's invasion demonstrates the importance of credible civil defense in raising war costs for aggressors and complicating expectations of quick and decisive victories.
Taiwan can adopt South Korea's approach to civil defense, which began resuming large-scale drills in 2023. South Korea's Civil Defense Corps, comprising former conscripts aged 20 to 40, provides dual functions in wartime and post-war scenarios, training members in evacuation, rescue operations, and supporting military tasks.
Written by urgent.news from The Diplomat's reporting — not their text. Machine-written — may contain errors; check the original before relying on it.
