When U.S.-Russia Cooperation Worked – And Why Its Collapse Still Matters

During the late 1990s, I frequently traveled to Moscow’s Lubyanka Square to engage with Russian federal security service officials on active cases. These meetings were characterized by direct communication and professional trust, rather than strict protocols. This cooperative relationship flourished in the mid-1990s through the early 2000s, a period when active U.S.-Russia security cooperation was possible and encouraged in limited contexts.

As an FBI legal attaché in Moscow, I observed firsthand how this collaboration thrived despite the complexities of the times. Even within institutions seen as adversaries, there was a pragmatic willingness to address shared criminal threats when interests aligned. This cooperation was often informal, with meetings proposed spontaneously rather than through formal channels.

One notable instance involved resolving a sensitive dispute over the arrest of a Russian intelligence officer in the U.S. within days, without escalation. This kind of cooperation was feasible due to a shared understanding among practitioners that certain threats — like organized crime and financial theft — required cross-border collaboration.

However, this cooperation was fragile, relying on personal relationships and a narrow window of political tolerance. It was never institutionalized and depended on circumstance rather than design. As Russian-Western relations deteriorated in the early 2000s, the informal mechanisms for cooperation became unsustainable. Trust eroded, and direct engagement diminished, replaced by suspicion and constraint.

The collapse of this operational engagement left behind more than a diplomatic void; it created a fragmented operational landscape that continues to impact security risks across the region. This void contributed to porous borders and uncoordinated responses to transnational criminal networks in the fifteen former Soviet states. The consequences of this breakdown extended beyond Russia, affecting security across the region.

In Central Asia, for instance, border disputes sometimes escalated into violence due to the lack of sustained mechanisms for cooperation. Law enforcement and border authorities struggled to engage directly, leading to improvised coordination when tensions flared. The absence of a coherent operational framework meant that borders remained vulnerable, and criminal networks could operate with less resistance.

In my work advising on border security across the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, I saw this fragmented security environment as a persistent issue. Coordination often had to be improvised during moments of tension, which, when combined with already strained relationships, made managing shared risks extremely challenging.

While broader geopolitical tensions are a significant factor in this instability, they are not the only cause. The broader problem lies in the operational gaps that exist where many cross-border threats originate. Diplomacy and deterrence, while important, cannot fully address these gaps. Without structured cooperation, managing cross-border threats remains a significant challenge.

Today, limited and informal cooperation continues in response to acute risks, but these interactions are fragile. They demonstrate that the need for cooperation remains, but the challenge now is how to structure it for long-term sustainability. A potential solution could be a narrowly focused, practitioner-driven mechanism to sustain limited operational engagement across the former Soviet space.

This approach would involve a small forum of experts — such as law enforcement officials, border security specialists, and investigators — who could work together on specific, immediate threats. This kind of mechanism would not resemble traditional multilateral institutions and would focus on technical cooperation rather than political alignment.

By prioritizing practical, day-to-day cooperation, it could help fill the operational gaps that plague the region today.