{
  "id": 4912117,
  "title": "Japan, South Korea, and the New Logic of Nuclear Energy Security in Northeast Asia",
  "url": "https://urgent.news/2026/09/01/japan-south-korea-and-the-new-logic-of-nuclear-energy-security-in",
  "topic": "world",
  "section": "World",
  "published": "2026-09-01T15:44:00.000Z",
  "source": {
    "name": "The Diplomat",
    "slug": "the-diplomat",
    "url": "https://thediplomat.com/2026/09/japan-south-korea-and-the-new-logic-of-nuclear-energy-security-in-northeast-asia/"
  },
  "original_language": "en",
  "account": "After the 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Plant accident, Japan halted all nuclear power production. The nation is now restarting reactors, redefining nuclear power as a pillar of national and regional security instead of a liability. Simultaneously, South Korea, its neighboring rival in reactor exports, is pursuing a parallel path, despite a change of government that initially threatened the opposite direction. Together, Japan and South Korea are reshaping nuclear politics in Northeast Asia, increasingly in coordination with Washington, as energy policy integrates into broader trilateral security cooperation.\n\nThe central challenge in both countries' nuclear restarts is managing the spent fuel accumulating at reactor sites. During my recent visit to Japan's Horonobe Underground Research Laboratory, I learned about efforts to test geological disposal methods that the international nuclear community relies upon. Horonobe serves as a research facility, not a permanent waste repository, and Japan still lacks a designated site for long-term storage. This gap hasn't dampened political momentum above ground.\n\nPrior to 2011, nuclear power contributed roughly 30% of Japan's electricity. Following the Fukushima disaster, all commercial reactors were shuttered, and public sentiment turned decisively against nuclear energy. For over a decade, Japan relied on imported liquefied natural gas and coal, costing the country dearly as it imports approximately 90% of its primary energy. The return to nuclear power gained momentum under Prime Minister Kishida Fumio's Green Transformation (GX) policy, announced in 2022. The GX Basic Policy, ratified in February 2023, committed to restarting cleared reactors and building next-generation designs. The Seventh Strategic Energy Plan, approved in February 2025 alongside the GX2040 Vision, solidified nuclear power's role in government policy, rather than a temporary emergency measure.\n\nEarly 2026 saw the restart of Unit 6 at Tokyo Electric Power Company's Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant, the world's largest nuclear facility by capacity, operated by the same company responsible for Fukushima Daiichi. This would have been politically unthinkable a decade ago. The impetus is clear: new public funding for data center and semiconductor facilities, totaling over a trillion yen, mandates that electricity used be derived solely from renewable or nuclear sources. This signals that Tokyo now considers nuclear energy indispensable to industrial policy, not just climate goals.\n\nSouth Korea is charting a similar course, even though it once appeared to be moving in a different direction. President Lee Jae-myung took office in June 2025, initially advocating skepticism toward nuclear power due to its perceived inherent dangers and the need to reevaluate the reactor-heavy generation mix in favor of renewables. However, within seven months, confronted with overwhelming public support for nuclear energy and surging electricity demand from the AI-driven data center boom, the South Korean government reversed its stance. Seoul now plans to proceed with two new large reactors under the 11th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand, targeting nearly 32% nuclear share by 2030 and over 35% by 2038. In August 2026, Seoul further emphasized nuclear energy's strategic importance, designating small modular reactors and nuclear fusion as potential growth engines for the Korean economy. South Korean reactor technology already competes with Western vendors. Around the same time Lee took office, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power signed a $18.6 billion deal to build two APR-1000 reactors in Dukovany, Czechia, and has since formed cooperation agreements for nuclear development in the Philippines, studies on small reactors with Singapore, and comprehensive fuel-cycle collaboration with France's Orano. Like Japan, South Korea imports approximately 90% of its energy needs and about 30% of its low-enriched uranium from Russia, viewing nuclear exports and domestic energy security as interconnected policy dimensions. In July 2026, nuclear energy was included as an area of interest for trilateral cooperation between the United States and its two East Asian allies, extending their security partnership into commercial nuclear cooperation. With Russia and China as the primary nuclear vendors for many developing countries, Washington has a vested interest in ensuring that Japan and South Korea assume this role, preventing Beijing or Moscow from monopolizing the market. For Tokyo and Seoul, integrating nuclear commerce into their trilateral security relationship also serves as a form of insurance, as both countries' export ambitions still navigate Washington's non-proliferation rules and, in South Korea's case, the 123 Agreement governing nuclear cooperation with the United States. While Japan has restarted a handful of reactors out of the approximately three dozen that existed before 2011, its domestic nuclear capacity remains incomplete, leaving South Korea as the more credible nuclear supplier for now.",
  "summary": "The two neighbors are reshaping the nuclear politics of Northeast Asia – and doing so increasingly in concert with Washington.",
  "key_points": [],
  "editors_take": null,
  "illustration": null,
  "coverage": {
    "outlets": 1,
    "also_reported_by": []
  },
  "ai_generated": true,
  "disclaimer": "Summaries, key points and the editor’s take are written by software from other outlets’ reporting and may contain errors — always check the linked original."
}