{
  "id": 3998673,
  "title": "Beyond Paris and Moscow: The AES and test of Sahelian security",
  "url": "https://urgent.news/2026/08/28/beyond-paris-and-moscow-the-aes-and-test-of-sahelian-security",
  "topic": "world",
  "section": "World",
  "published": "2026-08-28T16:50:25.000Z",
  "source": {
    "name": "MyJoyOnline Ghana",
    "slug": "myjoyonline-ghana",
    "url": "https://www.myjoyonline.com/beyond-paris-and-moscow-the-aes-and-test-of-sahelian-security/"
  },
  "original_language": "en",
  "account": "In early July 2026, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, convened meetings with counterparts from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in Niamey, the capital of Niger. The gathering saw the three nations welcome Russian military support, particularly the establishment of the Alliance of Sahel States' new Unified Force. This support followed the recent attack on Niamey’s international airport and military complex by JNIM, an al-Qaeda-aligned coalition, which resulted in the deaths of 11 soldiers and two civilians.\n\nThe situation highlighted the Central Sahel’s security paradox, where three military governments had removed French troops, dismantled significant Western security cooperation, and severed ties with ECOWAS, opting instead to establish new institutions with Russia’s involvement. While this shift allowed Sahelian states to reject former partners and build new military-led institutions, it did not equate to improved security outcomes for civilians. The breakaway order has bolstered government control over foreign and defense policy, yet the protection of civilians and the rebuilding of accountable civilian rule remain unaddressed. This new order arose from a security failure, with coups orchestrated by a shared political logic. In Mali, the armed forces removed President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in 2020, and Colonel Assimi Goïta took control in 2021. Burkina Faso experienced two coups in 2022, with Captain Ibrahim Traoré ousting Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba in 2023. In Niger, General Abdourahamane Tchiani overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum in 2023. Each coup was justified by the indictment that elected leaders, foreign troops, and regional institutions had failed to curb jihadist expansion. ECOWAS responded to Niger’s coup with sanctions and a threat of force, later lifting sanctions in 2024. The juntas framed the coup response as a shared grievance, as the previous arrangement was extensive. France initially launched Operation Serval in Mali in 2013, followed by Operation Barkhane, which had 5,100 French personnel in the region by mid-2021. European special forces operated through Task Force Takuba, and the EU trained Malian forces. The US based surveillance drones at Air Base 201 in Niger, a facility costing over $100 million, and maintained around 1,000 personnel in the country. The UN Mission in Mali, MINUSMA, deployed approximately 13,000 peacekeepers before its closure. This complex arrangement, while effective in certain areas, failed to establish durable state authority or public confidence, resulting in a security situation where mobile targeting coexisted with weak administration, abusive forces, local disputes, and exclusion. MINUSMA’s stabilisation and protection mandate contrasted with Barkhane’s combat mission, but public discourse often conflated the two, attributing the failure to a single failing foreign presence. The departure of French troops followed a similar timeline in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. France completed its withdrawal from Mali in August 2022, ended its operation in Burkina Faso in February 2023, and withdrew its last troops from Niger in December 2023. Mali requested the termination of MINUSMA, with the mission closing at the end of 2023. ECOWAS was left with only three member states, leading them to create the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023, focusing on mutual defence and coordinated action. The AES later transformed into the Confederation of Sahel States (Confederation AES) in 2025, with the aim of unified defence and foreign policy. However, the AES currently lacks a fully tested unified force of 6,000 troops, dependable air support, and a robust intelligence network. This gap mirrors the shortcomings of the former G5 Sahel Joint Force, which operated from 2017 to 2023 with similar constraints. Russia’s involvement varies among the three countries, with Mali having the most extensive combat partnership, including Wagner personnel and training support. Burkina Faso and Niger have engaged Russia to a lesser extent, focusing on training, equipment, and protection. While Russia plays a significant role in the new order, it is not an exclusive component, as the Sahelian states have also acquired equipment and support from Türkiye, China, Iran, and other nations.",
  "summary": "In early July 2026, Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, met his counterparts from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in Niamey.",
  "key_points": [],
  "editors_take": null,
  "illustration": null,
  "coverage": {
    "outlets": 1,
    "also_reported_by": []
  },
  "ai_generated": true,
  "disclaimer": "Summaries, key points and the editor’s take are written by software from other outlets’ reporting and may contain errors — always check the linked original."
}