{
  "id": 3789187,
  "title": "Tajikistan and Russia: The Syndromes of Missed Opportunity and Neglected Attention",
  "url": "https://urgent.news/2026/08/27/tajikistan-and-russia-the-syndromes-of-missed-opportunity-and",
  "topic": "world",
  "section": "World",
  "published": "2026-08-27T18:07:02.000Z",
  "source": {
    "name": "Riddle Russia",
    "slug": "riddle-russia",
    "url": "https://ridl.io/tajikistan-and-russia-the-syndromes-of-missed-opportunity-and-neglected-attention/"
  },
  "original_language": "en",
  "account": "For five years, Russia's relations with Central Asian countries have changed significantly. The war in Ukraine, while a significant factor, is not the only reason for this change. The deeper reason lies in the political transitions within Central Asia, where almost all countries have seen changes in leadership since 2016. Tajikistan, however, remains the only country where the political regime has not transitioned, with President Emomali Rahmon in power since before independence.\n\nRahmon, known as the \"Founder of Peace and National Unity\", is unique in Central Asia, along with Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenka, as the only two leaders who have held power continuously since their countries gained independence. This continuous rule shapes both Tajikistan's internal politics and its approach to external partners.\n\nThe lack of change in Tajikistan's stance towards Russia, despite the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, was predictable. Dushanbe neither openly rejected the separatist regions nor showed sympathy towards Russia's actions. Instead, it maintained a neutral stance, which was expected given its dependence on Russia and minimal Western political presence.\n\nHowever, the situation in Tajikistan has changed over the past four years. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has not only increased risks for Tajikistan but also brought new economic opportunities that other neighbors have capitalized on. Due to the war, Tajik labor migration to Russia has recovered, with remittances equal to 34% of the country's GDP. Russia also tightened security coordination with Tajikistan after the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan.\n\nIn 2022, Russia launched large-scale military exercises and reinforced its military base, which was home to around 7,500 troops. Tajikistan, relying heavily on Russian support, continued to provide infrastructure and social financing from international organizations. However, Russia's military-industrial complex started using grey-import channels, leading to the imposition of secondary sanctions on three Tajik banks.\n\nThe missed-opportunity syndrome became evident at the first Russia-Central Asia summit in Astana in autumn 2022. The Tajik leadership realized they were left either to adapt to Moscow's conditions or to diversify their foreign policy. This realization led to a situation where Tajikistan was left on the margins of regional cooperation, with very few Russian businesses relocating there.",
  "summary": "Temur Umarov and Ruslan Norov on how the war in Ukraine has reshaped relations between Dushanbe and Moscow",
  "key_points": [],
  "editors_take": null,
  "illustration": null,
  "coverage": {
    "outlets": 1,
    "also_reported_by": []
  },
  "ai_generated": true,
  "disclaimer": "Summaries, key points and the editor’s take are written by software from other outlets’ reporting and may contain errors — always check the linked original."
}