{
  "id": 18118336,
  "title": "The cryptography behind electronic voting (and why paper ballots are still essential)",
  "url": "https://urgent.news/2026/11/04/the-cryptography-behind-electronic-voting-and-why-paper-ballots-are",
  "topic": "tech",
  "section": "Tech",
  "published": "2026-11-04T07:33:05.000Z",
  "source": {
    "name": "Lobsters",
    "slug": "lobsters",
    "url": "https://blog.trailofbits.com/2026/11/03/the-cryptography-behind-electronic-voting-and-why-paper-ballots-are-still-essential/"
  },
  "original_language": "en",
  "account": "As millions of Americans cast their votes in the recent U.S. midterms, most opted for paper ballots, which are safeguarded by stringent chain-of-custody protocols and, in certain instances, statistical audits. You might wonder why we still employ paper in elections and voting systems when sectors like banking, tax filing, and document signing have transitioned to fully electronic formats. The answer lies in security. This might be a surprise to some, given that cryptography and other security enhancements have facilitated secure electronic systems in various applications. In fact, cryptographic protocols such as Helios and ElectionGuard offer two critical safeguards in elections: safeguarding individual votes' secrecy and ensuring the final tally's independent verifiability. However, Helios is designed for lower-risk and lower-coercion environments, whereas ElectionGuard targets public elections but functions as a cryptographic layer in conjunction with traditional voting systems, rather than supplanting them.\n\nThis article delves into how cryptographic techniques can enhance ballot secrecy and prevent manipulation in electronic voting systems, alongside discussing their limitations. While cryptography can bolster election verifiability and offer other robust security attributes, it cannot wholly supplant the security and trust associated with conventional paper ballot systems during general elections. The National Academy of Sciences' 2018 report on election security asserts that electronic ballot return, or online voting, should not be utilized in general elections as \"no known technology ensures a marked ballot's secrecy, security, and verifiability when transmitted over the Internet.\" The complexity of this issue is evident when considering the stringent security guarantees required of any election system: maintaining voter privacy even when a voter may have a financial incentive to reveal their choice to a third party, ensuring ballot integrity, and achieving this in an electronic context where voters typically lack cryptographic identities and cannot cryptographically sign their ballots. Moreover, the electronic voting client and server themselves may be compromised. Voters should not be able to cast multiple votes, but verifying this without linking votes to voters is challenging, especially since voters often lack digital cryptographic identities. Ensuring trust (and ideally verification) that the election outcome accurately reflects voters' intentions is a universal challenge for paper-based voting systems as well. The core physical security measures in paper ballot election sites—voter identification to polling workers (preventing multiple votes from one person), provision of a ballot without names and a secure space to fill it in (protecting voter privacy), and direct hand-over of the ballot to a polling worker with a witness as it's submitted for counting (ensuring ballot integrity)—are effective for large-scale elections. However, the most challenging requirement, ensuring ballot integrity, relies on the assumption that election workers tally votes honestly and that chain-of-custody controls, coupled with post-election audits, would uncover any attempts to compromise the election outcome. Cryptography can augment the trust in this final requirement through end-to-end verifiability, which we will discuss further in this piece.\n\nElectronic systems introduce a uniquely dangerous failure mode absent in modern, sensible paper-based systems: a supply-chain or zero-day vulnerability across multiple voting machines and jurisdictions could allow a single individual to control and influence an election's outcome (and possibly avoid detection, depending on the system and the exact vulnerability). Traditional paper-based systems, on the other hand, are constrained by independent physical records and physical security measures, making it far more difficult for a single person to significantly alter an election outcome while remaining undetected. Software security alone is insufficient to secure electronic voting systems; the essential principle is not only implementing robust security measures but also designing the system so that any failure of these controls is detectable. This cannot be achieved solely through software whose correctness must be trusted. This concept is known as software independence: alterations in the election outcome caused by changes or errors (or vulnerabilities) in voting software must be detectable. Typically, this is accomplished using evidence that can be independently verified from the voting software, such as a paper ballot audit trail.\n\nHaving outlined the challenges of electronic voting, let's explore how contemporary system designs address these issues. We will concentrate on two electronic voting systems: Helios and ElectionGuard. Helios is a comprehensive voting protocol tailored for low-stakes elections where coercion is not a concern. It is notably employed by the International Association for Cryptologic Research to elect its board of directors. ElectionGuard, on the other hand, aims to provide end-to-end verifiability on top of existing election infrastructure. Extensive testing has been conducted alongside systems based on paper ballots.",
  "summary": null,
  "key_points": [],
  "editors_take": null,
  "illustration": null,
  "coverage": {
    "outlets": 1,
    "also_reported_by": []
  },
  "ai_generated": true,
  "disclaimer": "Summaries, key points and the editor’s take are written by software from other outlets’ reporting and may contain errors — always check the linked original."
}