{
  "id": 17122417,
  "title": "C2PA's eMudhra Moment",
  "url": "https://urgent.news/2026/10/29/c2pas-emudhra-moment",
  "topic": "tech",
  "section": "Tech",
  "published": "2026-10-29T20:33:44.000Z",
  "source": {
    "name": "Lobsters",
    "slug": "lobsters",
    "url": "https://www.da.vidbuchanan.co.uk/blog/c2pa-four.html"
  },
  "original_language": "en",
  "account": "The eMudhra incident highlighted the modern Web PKI ecosystem's response to a CA compromise. While most web browsers swiftly accepted the revocations, eMudhra attempted to minimize their responsibility and didn't disclose the exact cause of the failure. Additionally, numerous TLS clients lacked efficient revocation handling or weren't timely updating their trust stores. The C2PA ecosystem aims to address a problem similar to Web PKI but is still in its early stages. Current media verification tools do not support revocation, leaving room to explore how the C2PA ecosystem would respond to a comparable compromise.\n\nThe source material reveals an encrypted S/MIME message with a signature that links to Google's C2PA root CA, which is part of the official C2PA trust list. The methods used to generate this chain are not eligible for bug bounty rewards, as they are already public knowledge. Despite the similarities between the experiment and the eMudhra compromise, the latter involved a trusted intermediate, whereas the experiment utilized a leaf certificate with a private key of 4. This key allowed the demonstration, but it does not accurately represent the C2PA trust model in the context of TLS.",
  "summary": null,
  "key_points": [],
  "editors_take": null,
  "illustration": null,
  "coverage": {
    "outlets": 1,
    "also_reported_by": []
  },
  "ai_generated": true,
  "disclaimer": "Summaries, key points and the editor’s take are written by software from other outlets’ reporting and may contain errors — always check the linked original."
}