{
  "id": 1625605,
  "title": "Europa y la tentación de vigilar para proteger",
  "url": "https://urgent.news/2026/08/18/europa-y-la-tentacion-de-vigilar-para-proteger",
  "topic": "tech",
  "section": "Tech",
  "published": "2026-08-18T03:40:00.000Z",
  "source": {
    "name": "El Pais Economia",
    "slug": "el-pais-economia",
    "url": "https://cincodias.elpais.com/opinion/2026-08-18/europa-y-la-tentacion-de-vigilar-para-proteger.html"
  },
  "original_language": "es",
  "account": "In the European Parliament, 314 deputies backed rejecting the Council's stance, while 276 voted against and 17 abstained. A simple majority would have ensured an unambiguous outcome, but the text was in its second reading, requiring 360 votes, an absolute majority of the Chamber, to stop it. The majority refused, but it was not enough. A temporary exception allowing platforms to voluntarily analyze private communications had expired on April 3 after the Parliament rejected its extension. Permanent regulation also remained blocked. However, Parliament President Roberta Metsola asked the Council to resume the initiative. The Council retrieved the expired text, presented it as a new regulation, and adopted it urgently on July 2. Five days later, the Parliament accepted processing it with urgency and brought it directly to the plenary session, bypassing the usual committee examination just before the summer recess. All this happened according to formal rules. Yet, when a law expires, the Parliament rejects it and it returns through a route that makes it much harder to stop, the procedure can be legally and democratically abusive. Chat Control began in 2021 as a temporary exception to communication confidentiality. It was extended, expired, rejected, and now may return until 2028. The provisional seems to resemble a permanently approved policy delivered piece by piece. The risks faced by minors on the internet are real. The European Commission recently concluded, preliminarily, that Instagram and Facebook's design may violate the Digital Services Act. It highlights features like infinite scrolling, automatic playback, and recommendation systems, and considers insufficient Meta's measures against their effects on well-being. However, two ways of protecting exist. One is to act on those designing the problem: limit addictive features, require platform responsibility, and sanction non-compliance. The other transfers control to the entire population: verify ages, link logins to credentials, and expand communication surveillance. France and the World Health Organization have demanded July restrictions on age and verification systems. These tools can prove someone has reached a certain age without revealing their name to the platform. But the proof does not appear by magic. Someone must issue it, a device must store it, and a network of entities must consider it reliable. The question is not just whether we will need to show our ID to Instagram. It's about the identification infrastructure we are building, who will control it, and for what other uses it could serve. This political risk is accompanied by an immediate one: cybersecurity. The more services rely on a digital credential, the greater the potential damage of a failure. The European Union ranks public administration as the most targeted sector, with 38% of analyzed incidents. Digitizing identity does not eliminate fraud or data theft. It can concentrate their consequences. The European Commission's proposed age verification system was presented in April as a way to prove someone is over 18 without disclosing other personal data. Shortly after, a researcher demonstrated that it could be bypassed in under two minutes with physical access to the phone, if given a demonstration version. The Commission explained it was a test version and corrected the mistake. It was not a mass leak, nor does it prove that digital identity is unfeasible. It demonstrates something simpler: no system is infallible. And when a credential opens more doors, a mistake is no longer small. In March, 438 security and privacy researchers from 32 countries called for a moratorium on mandatory age verification deployments until its effectiveness and effects were better understood. They warn that they can be easily bypassed and, at the same time, force millions of adults to verify their identity to read news, search information, or communicate. Europe is not China. We have competitive elections, independent courts, data protection, free press, and mechanisms to challenge governmental abuses. But political differences should not prevent us from recognizing certain technological similarities. China has long demanded real identity registration for numerous internet services. Europe is far from that model, but it is beginning to normalize its pieces: identification, traceability, and preventive supervision. The alternative is not abandoning minors or surveilling the entire society. We can regulate platform design, investigate specific crimes with judicial authorization, maintain encryption, invest in prevention, and require any age verification to collect the minimum necessary data. The danger is not that Europe will one day become China. It is that it will gradually advance, exception after exception, towards a society where identifying oneself is a prerequisite for participation and being observed is considered the normal price of being protected. A democracy demonstrates its strength when it protects the vulnerable at any cost. It demonstrates it when it knows how to protect them without turning everyone else into suspects.",
  "summary": "Chat Control muestra cómo Europa normaliza mecanismos de supervisión mientras reduce los espacios de privacidad",
  "key_points": [
    "European Parliament rejects Council stance on surveillance, 314 to 276 votes",
    "Temporary exception for private communication analysis expired April 3",
    "Proposed age verification system faces cybersecurity and privacy concerns"
  ],
  "editors_take": "The European Parliament's acceptance of a regulation allowing communication surveillance, despite initial rejection, signals a shift towards a society where identification and observation are normalized as protection measures.",
  "illustration": null,
  "coverage": {
    "outlets": 1,
    "also_reported_by": []
  },
  "ai_generated": true,
  "disclaimer": "Summaries, key points and the editor’s take are written by software from other outlets’ reporting and may contain errors — always check the linked original."
}