{
  "id": 14216997,
  "title": "Russian Economy After the Elections",
  "url": "https://urgent.news/2026/09/24/russian-economy-after-the-elections-14216997",
  "topic": "finance",
  "section": "Finance & Markets",
  "published": "2026-09-24T09:10:26.000Z",
  "source": {
    "name": "Riddle Russia",
    "slug": "riddle-russia",
    "url": "https://ridl.io/russian-economy-after-the-elections/"
  },
  "original_language": "en",
  "account": "In the aftermath of the 18-20 September elections, Russia witnessed widespread speculation about the potential imposition of unpopular measures by the authorities. These predictions ranged from mobilization and exit visas to higher taxes, intensified nationalization, and a freeze on bank deposits. The sources of these fears are diverse, with Western experts, Ukrainian politicians, Russian economic commentators, and international think tanks contributing to the discourse. However, none of these measures appear inevitable. To examine the situation, it is crucial to consider the trajectory of the past four years, particularly since the onset of the full-scale war in autumn 2022. This period deviated from the norm due to fluctuations in export revenues, the exchange rate, sanctions, mobilization, and the anticipation of a rapid return to normality. Kremlin officials have been cautious in their approach to economic policy, aiming to avoid abrupt changes and emphasizing the concept of a \"special military operation\" rather than a conventional war. Official statistics on inflation and GDP growth should be taken with caution, but observable trends reveal a mixed picture. The ruble's exchange rate, asset and property prices, taxation, wage dynamics, and aggregate budget indicators all present a complex landscape. While the authorities have refrained from certain wartime measures, such as banning cross-border transfers or imposing price controls, they have made significant changes to the tax policy. Notably, in 2022, a mineral extraction tax on oil and gas was introduced, leading to an additional levy on Gazprom amounting to 416 billion rubles between September and December 2022. In 2023, a one-off tax for large companies was implemented, equal to 10% of their excess profits for the period 2021-2022. In 2025, the top personal income tax rate increased from 15 to 22%, and the corporate income tax rose from 20 to 25%. Small businesses operating under the simplified tax regime faced increased VAT requirements. Throughout this period, the authorities have intensified nationalization efforts, seizing assets worth 7.6 trillion rubles. Despite the ongoing full-scale war, the Kremlin has not fully embraced a war footing for the economy, as evidenced by measures taken to control the ruble's fluctuations and maintain a relatively stable budget. However, the political climate in Russia has seen a significant erosion of independent media and a crackdown on legal protest activities, leaving the Kremlin with the option to intensify political pressure on citizens while cautiously navigating economic policy to avoid further harm to the market economy.",
  "summary": "Vladislav Inozemtsev on why the Kremlin is likely to favor control and expropriation over putting the economy on a war footing after the State Duma elections",
  "key_points": [],
  "editors_take": null,
  "illustration": null,
  "coverage": {
    "outlets": 1,
    "also_reported_by": []
  },
  "ai_generated": true,
  "disclaimer": "Summaries, key points and the editor’s take are written by software from other outlets’ reporting and may contain errors — always check the linked original."
}